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Intergovernmental Relations Trumps Social Policy
Change: Trudeau, Constitutionalism, and Family
Allowances
RAYMOND BLAKE
Abstract
Family allowances were one of the few programs shared by all Canadian fam-
ilies from 1945 to 1992, and one of the few means of building social cohesion
across Canada. Family allowances became embroiled in the minefield of
Canadian intergovernmental relations and the political crisis created by the
growing demands from Quebec for greater autonomy from the federal govern-
ment in the early 1970s. Ottawa initially dismissed Quebec’s demands for
control over social programs generally and family allowance in particular.
However, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau offered family allowance reforms as
a means of enticing Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa to amend the British
North America Act. The government’s priority was constitutional reform, and it
used social policy as a bargaining chip to achieve its policy objectives in that
area. This study shows that public policy decisions made with regard to the
family allowance program were not motivated by the pressing desire to make
more effective policies for children and families.
Résumé
Les allocations familiales représentent l’un des programmes partagés par toutes
les familles canadiennes entre 1945 et 1992 et un instrument de cohésion sociale
à travers le pays. Au début des années 1970, le programme s’est retrouvé dans
le champ de mines des relations intergouvernementales canadiennes où les
demandes du Québec pour une plus grande autonomie à l’égard du gouverne-
ment fédéral se multipliaient. Dans un premier temps, Ottawa a rejeté les
demandes du Québec relatives au contrôle des programmes sociaux en général
et de celui des allocations familiales en particulier. Toutefois, le premier ministre
Pierre Trudeau a fini par offrir une réforme des allocations familiales comme
Aversion of this paper appeared in the Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy’s Public Policy
Paper Series in December 2007. The author wishes to acknowledge the generous financial
assistance of the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada that made the
research for this paper possible.
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moyen d’inciter le premier ministre du Québec Robert Bourassa à modifier l’Acte
de l’Amérique du Nord britannique. La priorité du gouvernement était la réforme
constitutionnelle, et Trudeau s’est ainsi servi de la politique sociale comme mon-
naie d’échange pour atteindre ses objectifs en ce domaine. Cette étude démontre
que les décisions gouvernementales prises à l’égard du programme des alloca-
tions familiales n’étaient pas motivées principalement par le désir d’élaborer des
politiques plus efficaces à l’égard des enfants et des familles.
Introduction
The constitutional and jurisdictional question has been an important part ofthe debate about family allowances in Canada since the idea of paying fam-
ilies an allowance to support the raising of children was first raised. In 1929,
when the Select Standing Committee on Industrial and International Relations
of the House of Commons studied family allowances, it paid particular attention
to the issue of jurisdiction: were family allowances a federal or a provincial mat-
ter?Although the Committee was not prepared to recommend family allowances
at that time, it advised that the government consider the whole jurisdictional
question which proved to be a perpetual challenge to social policy development
in Canada. Ernest Lapointe, the Minister of Justice, subsequently asked his
Deputy, W. Stuart Edwards, for a legal opinion on the matter, who concluded
that family allowances were within Ottawa’s jurisdiction because the federal
government could raise money and spend it as it wished. However, Prime
Minister Mackenzie King was not yet committed to a program of social security
for Canada that included family allowances.1 That commitment would come
near the end of the World War II. At that time, both Quebec and Ontario argued
that Ottawa had exceeded its constitutional reach with the program; King dis-
agreed, using Edwards’ decision as support for his position. Moreover, with a
strong central government clearly in the ascendancy, King dismissed those who
challenged Ottawa’s constitutional right to make payments to individual
Canadians. The Exchequer Court later confirmed Ottawa’s jurisdiction, when it
ruled in Anger vs. the Minister of National Revenue in 1957 that the 1945 Family
Allowances Actwas within Parliament’s purview to legislate for the peace, order,
and good government of Canada. That ruling did not settle the matter for long.2
1 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Department of National Health and Welfare
(hereafter DNHW), Accession 85-86/343, Box 12, file 3201-3-3 pt. 3, “Family Allowances —
Jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada,” 24 December 1979.
2 Canada Law Reports, Exchequer Court of Canada, 1957 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer for Canada,
1958), 83-7. After his claim for the $300 exemption for his children was denied by the Income
Tax Board, François–Albert Anger, a Quebec taxpayer, took the matter to court, claiming that
the Board’s decision constituted “an attack upon the legislative attributes of the Province in the
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By the 1960s support for the centralizing tendencies of the immediate post-
war period had waned as a new province-building era began.3 Quebec led the
charge for major changes in the operation of the federation, as it challenged
Ottawa’s right — as well as its effectiveness — in the delivery of many federal
programs, particularly those in the area of social policy. When Canada estab-
lished its contributory pension plan in 1966, for instance, Quebec opted for its
own plan and, not surprisingly, some of the more well-established social pro-
grams, notably family allowances, came to play an important role in the
Canadian minefield of federal-provincial relations throughout this period.
When that happened, the issue of jurisdiction, that is, which level of govern-
ment should control the family allowance program, became more important
than the social policy embedded in the program.
In the months leading to the Victoria Constitutional Conference in 1971,
Quebec demanded a constitutional amendment that would have effectively
transferred to the provinces both control over family allowances and the funds
that Ottawa expended on the programs.4 While Quebec often spoke of the need
for an integrated approach to social policy that would rationalize and stream-
line all social policy spending within the province, what it really wanted was to
extend to family allowances and other exclusive federal social programs the
principle of shared jurisdiction with the proviso that the provinces would pre-
vail in any instance where there was a conflict between the two levels of
government. Constitutional scholars have long been aware of the key role that
social policy played in Quebec’s ultimate rejection of the Victoria Charter, but
they have ignored how federal negotiators attempted to use social policy to
achieve their constitutional goals. Peter Russell, Kenneth McRoberts, and oth-
ers have argued that Quebec’s social policy proposals did not fit with Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau’s view of Canada as his government insisted on the
importance of national programs.5 What this analysis ignores is that the
Trudeau government used social policy — as had the Bourassa government —
as a key strategy in the constitutional negotiations in the early 1970s. Clearly,
social policies in Canada have lives long after they are implemented.
matter of civil rights and family authority.” The Court ruled that the Act was within the leg-
islative competence of the Parliament of Canada: it was “a national benevolent measure
assimilated in the good government of Canada clause.”
3 See R.A. Young, Philippe Faucher, and André Blais, “The Concept of Province-Building: A
Critique,” Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique 17,
no. 4 (December 1984): 783-818.
4 See Keith Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism, 2nd ed. (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987), 120-1.
5 Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey, 3rd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004),
85-91; and Kenneth McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1997), 146.
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This paper considers the impact of intergovernmental conflict on the devel-
opment of family allowances in Canada. Scholars have previously recognized
the role of the state itself in the creation of social welfare policy,6 and, in a
diverse and increasingly multinational state such as Canada, where the lines of
regional and ethnic cleavage have been particularly strong, some scholars have
argued that the social security system has been one way of maintaining national
unity.7 Those who have examined family allowances as a way to understand the
development of Canada’s social security system have offered a variety of expla-
nations for their origins and subsequent development. It has long been argued
that the King government introduced family allowances to maintain its strict
wage control system that was put in place at the beginning of World War II to
control inflation.8 Others have maintained that King embraced family
allowances solely to stifle the growing political threat on the left from the Co-
operative Commonwealth Federation.9 Marxist and neo-Marxist scholars
contend that family allowances were a way to maintain industrial harmony in
Canada. Taking as their starting point the conflict between capital and labour
they contend that programs such as family allowances have been used by the
state — with the support of big business — to ensure social control, to buy
peace with labour, and to legitimize the capitalist social structure.10 Feminist
6 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in
the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Richard Splane, “Social
Policy-Making in the Government of Canada,” in Canadian Social Policy, ed. Shanker A.
Yelaja, rev. ed. (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1987), 224-44; and
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “The Professionalization of Reform,” The Public Interest 1 (Fall
1965): 9.
7 T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1950); Keith Banting, “Social Citizenship and the Multicultural State,” in
Citizenship, Diversity, and Pluralism, ed. Alan C. Cairns, et al. (Montreal and Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999); Janine Brodie, “Citizenship and Solidarity:
Reflections on the Canadian Way,” Citizenship Studies 6, no. 4 (December 2002): 377-94.
8 Jane Ursel, Private Lives, Public Policy. 100 years of State Intervention in the Family
(Toronto: Women’s Press, 1992), especially 175-229.
9 See Brigitte Kitchen, “The Introduction of Family Allowances in Canada,” in The Benevolent
State in Canada: The Growth of Welfare in Canada, ed. Allan Moscovitch and Jim Albert
(Toronto: Garamond Press, 1987), 222-41; and Dennis Guest, The Emergence of Social
Security in Canada (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1991), 131-2.
10 Internationally, some of the major proponents of this approach are Ian Gough, The Political
Economy of the Welfare State (London: Macmillan, 1979); and Frances Fox and Richard
Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare (New York: Pantheon Books
1971). For the Canadian example, see Alvin Finkel, Social Policy and Practice in Canada: A
History (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006), especially Chapter 6. Ursel
also argues that “the driving force behind the development of the Family Allowance program
was the stalemate between business and labour over wages.” Ursel, Private Lives, Public
Policy, 191; Dominique Marshall, The Social Origins of the Welfare State: Québec Families,
Compulsory Education, and Family Allowances, trans. Nicola Doone Danby (Waterloo, Ont.:
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2006).
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and gender scholars, while embracing some of the tenets of Marxists, have used
the welfare state to explain sexual inequalities and the disadvantaged place of
women in Canadian society. For them, social policies such as family
allowances were designed to force women and children to remain dependent on
the primary male bread-winner and perpetuate the traditional role of women as
mothers and caregivers.11 While each of these interpretations has some valid-
ity, few public policy decisions are the result of a single interest group and
rarely the result of a single factor. Social policy making in Canada is complex;
it emanates from a variety of forces, and it is usually the result of a conjunction
of interests.
This paper suggests that the conflict between the federal government in
Ottawa and the provincial government in Quebec in the late 1960s and early
1970s was a primary force leading to major reforms to the family allowances
program in 1973. A few scholars have considered the role federalism plays in
the origins and development of social programs in Canada, but they have
largely ignored the impact of specific federal-provincial conflict on policy out-
comes in specific program areas.12 Canadian scholars are divided on the impact
of the federal system on social policy. Some have suggested that federalism has
had a negative impact on the development of the welfare state as it represents
a form of institutional fragmentation;13 others have argued that federalism actu-
ally encourages the growth of the welfare state as innovative policies adopted
in one jurisdiction are copied by others within the federation.14 In the case of
family allowances in the early 1970s, Ottawa attempted a series of reforms to
the program to satisfy Quebec’s demands for greater autonomy within the
Canadian federation during a period of intense constitutional negotiations.
These reforms came at a time when Canada and many of the other liberal wel-
fare states, including the United States and the United Kingdom, rediscovered
11 Nancy Christie, Engendering the State: Family, Work, and Welfare in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2000); Maureen Baker and David Tippen, Poverty, Social
Assistance and the Employability of Mothers: Restructuring Welfare States (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1999); Wendy McKeen,Money in their Own Name: The Feminist
Voice in Poverty Debate in Canada, 1970–1995 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004);
Jane Lewis, Should We Care About Family Change? The 2001 Joanne Goodman Lectures
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 8-9.
12 Keith Banting, “Institutional Conservatism: Federalism and Pension Reform,” in Canadian
Social Welfare Policy: Federal and Provincial Dimensions, ed. Jacqueline S. Ismael (Montreal
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1985), 48-74.
13 Harold Laski, “The Obsolescence of Federalism,” in The People, Politics and the Politician,
ed. A.N. Christensen and E.M. Kirkpatrick (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1941), 111-
17; Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism; and Keith Banting, “Institutional
Conservatism,” 48-74.
14 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, “The Practice and Theory of Federalism,” in Social Purpose for Canada,
ed. M. Oliver (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 371-93.
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poverty in their midst and realized that reforms were necessary to existing
social programs such as family allowances. The reforms to family allowances
that were first contemplated by the Trudeau government after 1968 to address
poverty in Canada changed radically in the heated constitutional debates of
1971. These reforms that were implemented in the early 1970s had more to do
with accommodating Quebec than helping families living in poverty, which had
been the primary imperative in reforming family allowances when the issue
first arose in the late 1960s.15
Jurisdiction and Family Allowances
Despite the heavy expenditure on social security after the end of the World War
II, it was clear by the 1960s that Canada’s social security system had not deliv-
ered its intended results. A series of investigations from governmental and
non-governmental agencies reported that poverty continued to be a serious
problem. In fact, there was a new-found consciousness of poverty throughout
North America. Not unexpectedly, questions were raised about the efficacy of
government expenditure on social security, especially among those in the pol-
icy branch of the Department of National Health and Welfare.
Quebec’s Family and Social Welfare Minister René Lévesque — who, in
1961, had led the province’s nationalization of the hydroelectric power compa-
nies — announced in November 1965 that he wanted control of all federal
social security programs in his province and wanted to limit federal involve-
ment to funding the programs.16 He maintained that Quebec City knew better
than Ottawa the particular needs of his province, a claim initially made in the
1963 Rapport du comité d’étude sur l’assistance publique, which had recom-
mended that the federal government withdraw from a variety of joint programs
and simply provide the province with the financial resources it expended on
these programs.17 Quebec believed that only through an integrated social secu-
rity program could it deal effectively with poverty, and that could not happen if
Ottawa continued to control programs such as family allowances. Lévesque’s
own plan for social security reform depended, in large measure, on getting his
hands on the $180 million that the family allowance program paid to families
in Quebec.
At a federal-provincial meeting of welfare ministers on 7-8 January 1966,
Lévesque demanded that Ottawa either radically reform the family allowance
program to meet the priorities of Quebec or, barring that, transfer funds for
the program to the provinces. He insisted on using “repatriation” to describe
15 Rick Van Loon, “ReformingWelfare in Canada,” Public Policy 27, no. 4 (Fall 1987): 470-505.
16 Le Devoir (20 Novembre 1965).
17 Government of Quebec, Report of the Study Committee on Public Assistance (Quebec City,
1963), commonly referred to as the Boucher Report.
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the transfer, suggesting that the transfer could be justified on constitutional
grounds.18 Of course, the reforms that Lévesque enunciated followed closely
the masters-in-our-own-house rhetoric of a more autonomous Quebec. While
the province had opted out of several federal-provincial programs during the
1960s, most notably the Canadian Pension Plan and Youth Allowances,19 the
withdrawal from family allowances would mark the first separation of Quebec
from the trio of longstanding national programs — old age pensions and unem-
ployment insurance, in addition to family allowances — that Ottawa had
established as purely federal initiatives to create a national social security pro-
gram during and immediately following World War II. If Quebec opted out of
family allowances — a program seen, in part, by federal political leaders as an
important aspect of Canadian citizenship — it would represent the strengthen-
ing of provincialism, particularly in Quebec, and an erosion of the strong
central government that had emerged in post-war Canada.
Lévesque’s request surprised Ottawa, though Judy LaMarsh, the Minister
of National Health and Welfare, and some of her colleagues in Lester B.
Pearson’s minority government, had already become concerned over Quebec’s
propensity to opt-out of national initiatives and demand cash transfers to estab-
lish its own parallel programs. In her view, Lévesque was becoming more and
more anti-Ottawa, and she contends that the government had decided that it
would take a firm position with Lévesque on family allowances.20 Ottawa indi-
cated to him that it had no intention of surrendering its control of the program.
Allan J. MacEachern, who replaced LaMarsh as minister in 1966, reportedly
commented: “We are in the family allowances field and we don’t contemplate
any withdrawal.”21 The defeat of the Liberal government in Quebec in June
1966 did little, however, to halt the province’s desire for greater control of fed-
eral social security measures.
Although officials in the Department of National Health and Welfare, the
department responsible for the administration of family allowances, had been
concerned for some time that the universal family allowance program was not
able to provide the level of assistance low income families required, Quebec
demands for control of the program accelerated the reform impetus that was
18 LAC, DNHW, vol. 2361, file 264-1-8, “Brief of the Province of Quebec for the Federal-
Provincial Conference on the CanadaAssistance Plan,” Ottawa, 7-8 January 1966, and “A note
of Quebec’s Proposal to Revise the Family and Youth Allowances Programs,” prepared by
Research and Statistics Division, 10 January 1966.
19 Quebec had pioneered the idea of youth allowances in 1961, a program that Canada adopted
for the whole country in 1964.
20 See Judy LaMarsh, Memoirs of a Bird in a GildedCage (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1969), 123-4; and Ottawa Evening Citizen (25 November 1965).
21 John Saywell, ed., Canada Annual Review for 1966 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1967), 49.
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slowly taking root in Ottawa. Several provincial governments, notably Quebec,
were already showing some interest in making social programs selective rather
than universal.22 The election of Pierre Trudeau as Liberal leader and prime
minister in 1968 gave additional impetus to those in National Health and
Welfare who had already decided that the universality of the family allowance
program limited its effectiveness as an anti-poverty measure. Trudeau told the
leadership convention, “In the field of social welfare programs it is my belief
that we have enough of this free stuff .... We have to put a damper on this rev-
olution of rising expectations .... We must not be afraid of this bogeyman, the
means test. We must be more selective, to help those who live on uneconomic
land or in city slums.”23 John Munro, Trudeau’s Minister of National Health
and Welfare, shared his leader’s sentiments.24
Social Security Reform and the Constitutional Agenda
Trudeau’s government also committed itself to constitutional reform in 1968. It
launched a series of constitutional conferences with the provinces that culmi-
nated in the Victoria Conference in June 1971. At one of the constitutional
meetings in December 1969, Ottawa attempted to bring some clarity to the
question of jurisdiction in matters such as income security and social policy.
Earlier attempts by Ottawa to introduce old age pensions and unemployment
insurance had proven difficult because of the constitutional uncertainties sur-
rounding jurisdiction. Greater clarity in the social policy field could be
established if the Constitution was reformed. Most of the provinces accepted
the principle that both the federal parliament and the provincial legislatures
had, and should continue to have, powers to make income support payments to
individuals. Others agreed that it might be best if the federal government alone
22 In Canada, many commentators and academics have associated “selectivity” with cutbacks in
social spending and an attempt to dismantle the welfare state. For example, see Allan
Moscovitch, “The Welfare State Since 1975,” Journal of Canadian Studies 21, no. 2 (Summer
1986): 83, where he wrote, “One means of eroding social welfare has been through the use of
more selectivity, or means testing benefits.”
23 LAC, Grace MacInnis Papers, vol. 12, file Social Security 1966-74, “A Social Policy for
Canada.” The memo attributes the quote from Trudeau to the Canadian Manufacturing
Association publication Industry (May 1968). In January 1969 the principle of selectivity was
introduced into the Family Allowances program in the United Kingdom. See J.I. Clark,
“Recent Trends and Developments in Guaranteed Income,” paper prepared for Nuffield
Canadian Seminar on Guaranteed Annual Incomes: An Integrated Approach, Canadian
Council on Social Development, April 1972.
24 Quoted in Rodney S. Haddow, Poverty Reform in Canada, 1958–1978: State and Class
Influences on Policy Making (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1993), 92. Munro told the Globe and Mail in May 1969 that, personally, he had considerable
doubt about paying family allowances benefits to high-income families, but, he hastily added,
the government had not yet considered the issue.
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controlled basic income support and income security programs. Quebec stood
alone, however, in insisting that the provinces should have exclusive jurisdic-
tion in these fields.25 Constitutional reform and social policy reform
subsequently became fused.
Ottawa began work on a White Paper on social security to assess each of
its programs, consider the constitutional implications of each, and propose a
series of initiatives and reforms that might lead to a more effective social secu-
rity system. Family allowances became part of this wider reconsideration of
social policy, and when Munro tabled the White Paper on Income Security for
Canadians in Parliament on 30 November 1970, it proposed to restructure the
existing family allowances in favour of a Family Income Security Plan (FISP)
to deal particularly with low income families. It set out a preferred course of
action that embodied four steps: first, retention of income tax exemptions for
dependent children; second, termination of family allowances for families with
incomes exceeding $10,000; third, tax family allowances and include them in
the income of the parent who claimed the exemption for any dependent chil-
dren; fourth, significantly increase the benefits for children in families with up
to $4,500 of family income by using the amounts recovered from taxing fam-
ily allowances and withholding payments to higher income families, and
provide graduated benefits to families with incomes between $4,500 and
$10,000. The new program would provide a monthly benefit of $16 for each
child under 16 in families with incomes up to $4,500. For families with
incomes between $4,500 and $10,000, monthly benefits would be reduced by
$1 for each $500 of income above $4,500, and benefits would cease once
incomes reached $10,000.26 The Family Income Security Program would have
more than doubled the amount paid to families living below the poverty line,
but would have eliminated benefits for 1.2 million or 39 percent of Canadian
families.27
While the reforms were in large part meant to satisfy the demands of
Quebec, the Government of Canada chose to act unilaterally. Although Munro
travelled to Quebec City immediately after he tabled the White Paper to meet
Quebec’s Social Affairs Minister Claude Castonguay and invite him to present
his comments at the annual Federal-Provincial Welfare Ministers’ Conference
scheduled for January 1971, the federal approach only served to confirm for
Castonguay how unresponsive Ottawa was to Quebec’s legitimate concerns.
25 Provincial Archives of New Brunswick (hereafter PANB), Records of the Department of
Finance (hereafter RDF), file 01-01-00, Ottawa — Conférence constitutionelle 1969,
Summary of Proceedings.
26 LAC, DNHW, Acc. 85-86/343, box 28, file 3301-3-C14, Privy Council Office, Record of
Cabinet Decision, 19 November 1970.
27 Ibid., Memorandum to Cabinet, 29 July 1970, and Memorandum to Cabinet, 1 September
1970.
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Ottawa announced its plans for social security just weeks before Quebec
released its study of social welfare, the Report of the Commission on Inquiry on
Health and Social Welfare (the Castonguay-Nepveu Commission). The Report
made four points: first, it accused the federal government of fragmenting social
and income security policies; second, it insisted that a policy approach geared
to providing a guaranteed income commensurate with essential needs was the
only means of alleviating the consequences of poverty; third, it claimed that
such a policy required a complete harmonization and coordination of federal
and provincial programs in the field of social policy; and fourth, an integrated
approach was possible only if the provinces were given overriding responsibil-
ity for the social policy framework and objectives.28 Castonguay described
FISP as “piecemeal” and insisted, Munro told his colleagues, that Quebec have
primary responsibility in social policy. Only then could Quebec implement an
effective social security system to help its citizens, particularly the working
poor. Castonguay told the federal-provincial conference in January 1971 that
Quebec required “primary responsibility in the conception of social policy, the
primacy of the power to legislate, [and] even in certain cases, the exclusivity of
such power,” but Ottawa would have to finance and even administrate the var-
ious legislative measures.29
Quebec dismissed the proposals contained in theWhite Paper. So, too, did
many in the middle class who would have seen their benefits eliminated.30
Even though Munro and his department realized quickly that there were serious
problems with the reforms they had proposed in the White Paper, they would
not have the opportunity to respond to those criticisms as family allowance
reform became inextricably linked to constitutional change. When that hap-
pened, Munro saw his authority on the subject disappear as responsibility for
reforming the family allowance program moved to the prime minister’s
office.31
Although Trudeau had high hopes for constitutional reform, he failed to
appreciate that there were fundamental differences between Ottawa and the
English-speaking provinces on the one hand, and Quebec on the other. While
Trudeau and the English-speaking premiers sought fairly modest changes to
28 Ibid., file 3301-3-C8 pt.1, Memorandum to Cabinet from Mitchell Sharp, 1 February 1971.
29 Ibid., vol. 1937, file R234/100, “Summary of the Steps that have been taken to Accommodate
Quebec’s Point of View,” 15 June 1972.
30 Munro later disbanded a secretariat he had created in the department to answer questions about
the plan because of the lack of queries it had received. Winnipeg Free Press (20 September
1972).
31 LAC, Pierre Elliott Trudeau fonds (hereafter Trudeau fonds), MG 26 O7, vol. 117, file
Memorandum to the Prime Minister, Meeting of Cabinet Committees on Federal-Provincial
Relations, prepared by E. Gallant, 2 February 1971. In the memorandum Gallant noted that there
was “a certain amount of annoyance shown that Mr. Munro has come forward with major [social
policy] proposals at the last minute. Mr. Munro’s only active support came from Mr. Andras.”
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protect linguistic and cultural rights and entrench a modest charter of human
rights, they did not envision any fundamental change to the relationship
between the two levels of governments. They wanted to modernize the British
North America Act by removing certain articles that had fallen into disuse and
patriate the Constitution with a new amending formula. Quebec had much more
aggressive constitutional aspirations. It wanted to clarify and enlarge the leg-
islative and fiscal autonomy of the provinces with the goal of creating a
national government in Quebec City. This aim was no more evident than in the
area of social policy as outlined in the Castonguay-Nepveu Report. It recom-
mended a new and radical approach to social policy, and it provided Quebec
with further ammunition to insist that provincial legislative primacy in the area
of income security had to be enshrined in the Constitution.32
Quebec wanted the best of both worlds when it came to income security.
It insisted that provincial legislatures had paramountcy (or primary constitu-
tional authority) to legislate in the field of social policy and income security,
but that both levels of government shared the responsibility and the power to
finance and operate programs within the policy objectives and priorities estab-
lished by the provinces. The federal government was uncomfortable with such
an approach, but it realized, too, that any confrontation with Quebec over the
control of social policy would prevent it from patriating and amending the
British North America Act — a policy objective of considerable urgency for
Trudeau. Moreover, any confrontation with Quebec would have serious impli-
cations for Canadian unity. Such were the concerns over Quebec’s stand on
social policy that Mitchell Sharp, the Secretary of State for External Affairs,
recommended to the Cabinet that the federal delegation avoid the subject of
social policy in the Constitutional Conference scheduled for 8-9 February
1971.33 Such avoidance was quite unlikely, however, given that Bourassa had
made social security reform one of his major priorities. Many in Quebec
approved of the clause in the 1970 Manifesto of the Front de Libération du
Québec that attacked the inequities of the capitalist system.34 Castonguay, one
of the most powerful members of Bourassa’s Cabinet, made it clear on numer-
ous occasions that the existing constitutional division on social policy in
Canada was unacceptable.
32 DNHW, vol. 1605, file 6, Constitutional Conference, 3rd Working Session, 8-9 February 1971,
“Statement of Conclusions,” 8-9.
33 Ibid., Memorandum to Cabinet from Mitchell Sharp, 1 February 1971. Sharp said in the
Cabinet on 7 May 1970, in a discussion on the Quebec situation and national unity, “the gov-
ernment had to do everything possible to assist the new Premier of Quebec [Robert Bourassa]
because it might well be the last chance to solve the problems in Quebec.” LAC, Privy Council
Office, vol. 6359, Cabinet Conclusions, 7 May 1970.
34 John Saywell, ed., Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs 1971 (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1972), 42.
217
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS TRUMPS SOCIAL POLICY CHANGE:
TRUDEAU, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND FAMILYALLOWANCES
This position became abundantly clear at a February 1971 federal-
provincial constitutional meeting. R. Gordon Robertson, the Clerk of the
Privy Council and Cabinet Secretary, communicated regularly by telephone
with his counterpart in Quebec City, Julien Chouinard, and four days before
the conference Robertson briefed Prime Minister Trudeau. He told the prime
minister that if Ottawa was willing to give Quebec what it thought it needed
to meet objectives as laid out in the Castonguay-Nepveu Report, then social
policy might be kept separate from the constitutional file.35 Such a conces-
sion was unlikely given the position of many of the senior officials in the
government. Robertson had R.B. Bryce, his predecessor, convene a meeting
of the government’s senior officials, including A. W. Johnson and Simon
Reisman from the Department of Finance, and J.W. Willard from National
Health and Welfare, to consider Bourassa’s proposals. They preferred a coor-
dinated approach to social policy whereby the two levels of government
provided programs that complemented each other rather than an integrated
approach that essentially fused the various social policies offered by the two
levels of government. Ottawa was worried that an integrated approach would
have Quebec assuming leadership in the field of social policy with the federal
government losing a significant measure of control. The federal officials
advised against a guaranteed income as Castonguay had recommended sim-
ply because of the expense. They recommended, too, that the prime minister
reassure Bourassa that the federal government would endeavour to formulate
and operate its social policies in a manner that would contribute to provincial
social objectives while permitting each province the maximum flexibility in
developing its own social policies. Bryce advised Trudeau that he should be
clear in private with Bourassa that Ottawa had no intention of surrendering its
right to provide family allowances in Quebec, nor should Bourassa expect a
guaranteed income as it would necessitate an unacceptable increase in the
level of taxation. As Bryce wrote in his memorandum to the prime minister,
“They [Bourassa and Castonguay] should not expect us to tax other provinces
... in order to provide them with the funds necessary to finance a more
advanced social program than we are able and prepared to finance in other
provinces.”36
35 LAC, DNHW, Acc. 85-86/343, box 28, file 3301-3-C8, Memorandum for the Prime Minister,
prepared by Gordon Robertson, 4 February 1971. The memorandum was based on Robertson’s
telephone conversation with Chouinard.
36 Ibid., box 29, file 3301-3-C6, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, Re: Quebec’s Proposals in
Social Policy, prepared by R.B. Bryce, 5 February 1971. Bryce also reminded the prime min-
ister that if an arrangement on social policy were worked out with Quebec and then announced
to the other provinces without any prior notice, it would cause trouble in getting them to agree
on a package to patriate the Constitution “which most of them believe they are doing in order
to help Mr. Bourassa.”
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As the federal government anticipated, Bourassa made it clear at the Third
Working Session of the Constitutional Conference on 8-9 February 1971, that
social policy was a major issue for Quebec; it had to be included on the agenda
for the conference scheduled for Victoria in June 1971.37 The communiqué
from the meeting acknowledged the impasse between the federal and provin-
cial governments: social policy was fundamental to any constitutional change
for Quebec, but Ottawa offered only a coordinated approach which might lead
to greater cooperation between the federal and provincial governments and
even allow the provinces to achieve their social policy priorities; but Ottawa
would not transfer the sums it expended on social policy to the provinces.38
New Brunswick Premier Richard Hatfield insisted that it was crucial that
Ottawa maintain its spending power in social policy to protect the national
interest, and Saskatchewan Premier Ross Thatcher stated that if Quebec
secured greater powers it would mean the end of Ottawa’s authority to deal with
national problems. Thatcher was blunt in his assessment, noting, “If Quebec
persists with the demands she [sic] is making today, perhaps she [sic] should
become a separate nation.”39 Despite the gulf between Quebec and the other
governments, social policy was put on the agenda for the Victoria conference.
For the Trudeau Cabinet, then, the question became one of working out a
mutually acceptable approach with Quebec as it kept in mind the interests of
the other provinces.40 The Cabinet had decided some time earlier that it would
continue to make direct payments to individuals. Yet Quebec had proposed an
income security system that would see the existing programs — federal as well
as provincial — folded into a unified structure, and it insisted that the provinces
had priority in the conception of income security policy, if not primacy in mat-
ters of determining benefits and administration. In others words, if the province
decided to move into an area where the federal government operated, Ottawa
would simply withdraw and turn over to the province the fiscal equivalent of
all monies spent in that particular province.
An overwhelming concern for Trudeau became the need to satisfy the
interests of Quebec.41 The Cabinet Committee on Federal-Provincial Relations
took control of the file in early 1971, as the discussions on social policy accel-
37 Ibid., vol. 1937, file R234/100, Summary of the Steps that have been taken to Accommodate
Quebec’s Point of View, 15 June 1972.
38 PANB, RDF, file 01-03-00, Ottawa — Conference — Constitutional, 1971, Statement of
Conclusions.
39 Saywell, Canadian Annual Review of Politics and Public Affairs 1971, 44.
40 See Trudeau fonds, MG 26 O7, vol. 117, Memorandum to the Prime Minister, Meeting of
Cabinet Committees on Federal-Provincial Relations, prepared by E. Gallant, 16 February
1971.
41 Privy Council Office, Cabinet Minutes, 25 February 1971; and Trudeau fonds, MG 26 O7, vol.
117, Memorandum to the Prime Minister, Meeting of Cabinet Committees on Federal-
Provincial Relations and Social Policy, prepared by R.B. Bryce, 1 March 1971.
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erated and broadened. Bryce, by this time the Economic Adviser to the Prime
Minister on the Constitution and Chair of the Interdepartmental Committee on
Federal-Provincial Social Policy Issues, played the leading role. He realized
that the success achieved in the discussions on social policy would have an
important bearing on Quebec’s willingness to approve the proposals for consti-
tutional revision that Ottawa was preparing for the First Ministers’
Constitutional Conference scheduled for June. A memorandum prepared for
Trudeau on 16 February 1971, made the issue abundantly clear: The Cabinet
did not want constitutional change in respect of social policy, but it realized
“that unless Quebec is able to argue that it has obtained ‘something of sub-
stance’ in the field of social security there may not be agreement in Victoria on
the constitutional proposals.”42 Still, Bryce reminded the Cabinet, Quebec was
dependent on federal financing for many of the programs for which it
demanded primary responsibility, and that fact alone was perhaps enough to
prevent it from saying “that [its] approval of the present constitutional propos-
als is definitely contingent upon agreement on the constitution or other
particular changes in this field.” Yet, he told the ministers, Quebec had two
objectives. One was ostensibly political — to stand up to the federal govern-
ment and gain something of substance out of the constitutional discussions. The
other was essentially policy — to make the most of the resources available to
the province to allow it to develop a program along the lines suggested in the
Castonguay-Nepveu Commission and deal with the persistent problem of wide-
spread poverty in the province.43
To allow Quebec to save face, Bryce said it might be necessary to consider
some modest provision in the Constitution relating to social measures that
would not impair the powers of Parliament to make payments to individuals. At
the same time Bryce spelled out the approach that Munro should adopt for a
meeting with Castonguay on 29 March. Bryce effectively told Munro what to
say: he suggested that the minister should first indicate sympathetic interest in
Quebec’s proposal to have the family allowance proposals address the require-
ments of large families, and, second, generally try to find out what Castonguay
really desired with his income security policies. Munro offered to make a num-
ber of changes in FISP to conform to the principles underlying the family
allowance recommendations in the Castonguay-Nepveu Report.44 Bryce subse-
quently reported to the Cabinet on the meeting between Munro and
Castonguay. The atmosphere at the meeting, he told the Cabinet, was tense,
42 Trudeau fonds, MG 26 O7, vol. 117, Memorandum to the Prime Minister…prepared by E.
Gallant, 16 February 1971.
43 LAC, DNHW, Acc. 85-86/343, box 28, file 3301-3-C6, Memorandum to Cabinet, prepared by
Bryce, 1 March 1971.
44 Ibid., file 3301-3-C8, pt. 1, Bryce to Willard, 24 March 1971.
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even though Munro offered to modify his proposals for family allowances in
light of the Castonguay-Nepveu Report. This concession was not enough for
the Quebec Minister, who told Munro that he wanted family allowances to
become completely a Quebec program, both in structure and administration. He
also wanted Ottawa to transfer to Quebec the financial equivalent of the family
allowance benefits it would pay directly in Quebec under a federal program.
Castonguay said the Constitution should give Parliament the power to legislate
in a field of social policy only if Quebec did not; if Quebec chose to legislate
in the field, its legislation would have precedence, and any subsequent federal
initiative would not apply in Quebec, except to the extent permitted by Quebec
law. In such an event, the federal government had to compensate Quebec for
the amount that would have been spent in the province if the federal laws had
been applicable. Castonguay then provided Munro with a preliminary draft text
of a constitutional section that would satisfy Quebec.45
This proposal was more than Ottawa was willing to concede. ByApril 1971,
just two months before the Victoria Conference began, Ottawa adopted a differ-
ent approach: it decided to inject more money into the family allowance program
as a way to gain support from Quebec. The Cabinet authorized an additional $150
million for the program, bringing expenditure to $800 million. Interestingly, sev-
eral months earlier the Cabinet had steadfastly refused to allocate extra funds to
increase benefits for families living in poverty, and the $150 million was the
amount that a detailed study of the 1971–1972 Estimates for the Committee on
Priorities and Planning of Cabinet had set as the ceiling that could be added to
the1971–1972 budget for all forms of social security.46 Now, all of it was being
used to try and bring Quebec on side. The Cabinet was able to justify the new
expenditure for family allowances on the grounds that it would go some way to
meet the demands of Quebec and address some of the criticisms levelled at the
proposals contained in the White Paper on Social Security. Ottawa proposed to
direct additional benefits to large families and drop the proposal to tax family
benefits. Federal officials realized that these two measures would not put more
money into the hands of low-income families, but they would go some distance
to satisfying Quebec and answering the critics of theWhite Paper.47 The Cabinet
approved the changes on 16April 1971, but insisted that Quebec not be told about
the additional funds until an appropriate or opportune time.48
45 Ibid., file 3301-3-C8, pt.2, Memorandum to Cabinet, Report on initial discussions with
Minister of Social Affairs of Quebec, prepared by Bryce, 30 March 1971.
46 Don Jamieson, A World Unto Itself: The Political Memoirs of Don Jamieson, ed. Carmelita
McGrath. (St. John’s: Breakwater Books, 1991), 44.
47 LAC, DNHW, vol. 1629, file 1, Memorandum, Allocation of $150 million Additional Funds
for FISP, 7 April 1971.
48 Ibid., Acc 85-86/343, box 28, file 3301-3-C8, pt. 2, Memorandum to Cabinet, Negotiating
Positions on Social Policy with Quebec, submitted by John Munro, 26 April 1971.
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As the Cabinet prepared to sweeten its offer to Quebec, it maintained that
a constitutional amendment to include family allowances in section 94A of the
British North America Act, as Castonguay insisted, was unnecessary. Quebec
already operated in the provincial field, and Ottawa was provided family
allowances under its use of the federal spending power. If Ottawa agreed to
Quebec’s request for an amendment, it would be put in the impossible situation
of implicitly agreeing that its longstanding use of the federal spending power to
pay family allowances was constitutionally suspect. The best strategy, Ottawa
thought, was to offer Quebec an administrative arrangement for coordinating
family allowances in that province.49 John Turner, the Minister of Justice,
warned the Cabinet on 4 May 1971, however, that a deal with Quebec was
unlikely without a constitutional amendment. The Quebec government, Turner
told the Cabinet, could not possibly agree to the proposed Constitutional
Charter to be presented in Victoria without an amendment regarding social pol-
icy if it hoped to secure the approval of any change in the Quebec Assembly.
Bourassa had said at the Constitutional Conference in April that family
allowances must be included in Section 94A of the Constitution so that it would
read:
The Parliament of Canada may make laws in relation to old age pensions and
supplementary benefits, including survivors’ and disability benefits irrespec-
tive of age, and in relation to family allowances, but no such law shall affect
the operation of any law present or future of a provincial legislature in rela-
tion to any such matters.
Ottawa had to decide what to do about Bourassa’s proposal. The Department of
Justice did not see any serious problem accepting it from a legal perspective.
However, Turner warned the Cabinet that there were risks to federal-provincial
relations, as well as political implications, to do so. The most serious risk, of
course, was that Quebec might insist that the change was an important one, and
it might eventually demand that Ottawa withdraw from the fields in which the
province enacted legislation. Turner was worried that if Quebec exaggerated
the meaning and implications of the amendment, some of the other provinces,
particularly in Atlantic Canada and the West, might oppose any substantial
weakening of the federal power in social policy. Ottawa could, he said,
acknowledging the position already adopted by the Cabinet, continue in the
field of family allowances, and amend Section 94A as Bourassa suggested,
which would give Parliament full power to legislate with respect to family
allowances in the same way that it had power to legislate with respect to mat-
ters enumerated in Section 91. Turner recommended that the Cabinet accept
49 Ibid.
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Quebec’s proposal to include family allowances in Section 94A, but only if
Bourassa and Castonguay understood fully Ottawa’s position. Even so, Turner
reminded the Cabinet that they should inform Quebec of their decision just
before the ministerial meeting on the Constitution on 31 May-1 June because if
the issue was settled too early Quebec might be encouraged to seek something
else before June 14.50
Victoria Conference
When he opened the Constitutional Conference in Victoria on 14 June, Trudeau
said repatriation and an amending formula had been the main objective of the
Conference, but social policy had emerged as a major issue. He acknowledged
that Quebec had proposed that the provincial legislatures be given the author-
ity to limit the power of the federal Parliament to make income security
payments, such as family allowances, in the provinces. If the federal govern-
ment acceded to the demands of Quebec to divert federal spending for social
policy to the provincial treasuries and allow each province to determine how to
spend the funds, it would not only lead to the erosion of the federal presence in
such areas, but also might undermine Ottawa’s ability to collect taxes in afflu-
ent provinces to support provincial programs in have-not provinces.51 The
federal government was faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, it had decided
that it would not consider any constitutional change that emasculated federal
spending power and ability to redistribute monies in relation to individuals; but
still it wanted to provide “the necessary minimum to Mr. Bourassa” that would
allow him to win support for the constitutional package in the National
Assembly of Quebec.52
After three days of debating various constitutional proposals, the confer-
ence concluded at midnight on 16 June with a new Canadian Constitutional
Charter. The Victoria Charter addressed a variety of issues, including political
and language rights, the appointment of Supreme Courts judges, and an amend-
ing formula; but the major issue at the conference came down to the issue of
jurisdiction over social policy, which, as one commentator noted, was a micro-
cosm of the larger issue of the division of legislative and taxing powers.53 As
mentioned above, the federal government was willing to go only part way to
50 Ibid., vol. 1629, file 1, Memorandum to Cabinet, Quebec Proposal to Amend the Constitution
Concerning Family Allowances, 4 May 1971, submitted by John Turner and accompanying
Appendix A, Inclusion of Family Allowances in Section 94A.
51 John Saywell and Paul Stevens, “Parliament and Politics,” in Canadian Annual Review of
Politics and Public Affairs 1971, Saywell, 51-2.
52 Trudeau fonds, MG 26 O7, vol. 103, file 306.21 — June 1971, Memorandum for the Prime
Minister. Strategy at Victoria, 7 June 1971. The memorandum is marked “Confidential” and
signed by R. Gordon Robertson.
53 Saywell and Stevens, “Parliament and Politics,” 56.
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meet Quebec’s demands for legislative primacy in social policy. Trudeau
insisted that Ottawa would not surrender its power to make direct payment to
individuals, but he agreed that federal legislation in social areas could “dove-
tail with their [Quebec] legislation in social areas and if there is a conflict, ours
[federal legislation] will have to adjust to theirs.”54 The federal government
agreed to amend Section 94, but the proposed amendment did not satisfy
Quebec. While the amendments recognized provincial paramountcy in the
fields of family allowance and other income security measures, it did not pro-
hibit Ottawa from participating in income support programs, nor did it offer to
provide financial compensation to the provinces if they chose not to participate
in a new federal initiative.55 The final communiqué from the Conference,
which promised that the premiers would meet shortly to discuss all aspects of
the federal-provincial fiscal arrangements, did not give Quebec the decentral-
ized federalism it sought.
Although Bourassa agreed to consider the Victoria Charter, he realized that
there was little support for it — labelled La Charte à Trudeau — in Quebec.
Peter Meekison, who attended the conference as part of the Alberta delegation,
contends that the Quebec representatives decided before they left Victoria that
they would not ratify the Charter.56 As Bourassa perhaps expected, opposition
in Quebec was fierce; Claude Ryan, the editor of the Le Devoir, wondered in
an influential editorial on 22 June why Bourassa had accepted a document “qui
tend á consolider la preponderance du gouvernement central dans les affaires
canadiennes et á ramener le Québec au rang de province comme les autres.”57
The Parti Québecois saw Bourassa’s acceptance of the Charter as an act of trea-
son against the people of Quebec. The premiers agreed that they would indicate
to Ottawa before 28 June whether or not they would take the Charter to their
legislatures for ratification.
Even as Bourassa considered the Victoria Charter with his Cabinet, Ottawa
continued to search for ways to solve the impasse over social policy with
Quebec. It was R.B. Bryce again who suggested a way forward. He recom-
mended a solution that would “assist” Quebec without additional cost to the
federal treasury, without loss of ultimate control of future federal programs, and
without creating the impression that Trudeau was doing anything special for
Quebec. He proposed that Ottawa allow all provinces — not just Quebec — the
option of determining how the federal benefit for each recipient would be made
within their province. This proposal was in keeping with the Cabinet’s insis-
tence that “in developing the federal position on the substance of social policy
54 Quoted in Ibid., 58-79.
55 Ibid., 48-9, 63. The Victoria Charter can be found at <http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/
Canada/English/Proposals/Victoria_Charter.html>, (viewed on 22 February 2008).
56 Peter Meekinson, interview by author, Calgary, 17 October 2003.
57 Quoted in Saywell and Stevens, “Parliament and Politics,” 61.
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it [was] important to bear in mind the need to avoid giving the appearance of a
substantive concession to Quebec alone.”58 The federal government would
continue to administer the program and send cheques directly to parents.
Bryce’s plan would allow Quebec, for example, to determine how its envelope
of funds were distributed in that province; it could decide the amount of the
benefit paid to each child, and it could, for instance, increase benefits for the
fourth child and subsequent children in a family at the cost of some reduction
in the scale of payments for other children. The added incentive for Ottawa,
Byrce suggested, was that only Quebec was likely to be interested in such an
option.59 Bryce’s plan conformed to Trudeau’s vision of federalism that was
determined to reverse the trend towards special status for Quebec by allowing
all provinces to make special arrangements with Ottawa in the delivery of
social programs.60
Bryce said the proposals should be put to Premier Bourassa on 23 June “if
it appears that such action is needed and has a good chance of success in gain-
ing Quebec’s approval to the Charter.” Bryce added that there seems to be a
“reasonable chance of reaching a conclusion on this proposal by Monday, June
28, the deadline for governments to approve the Charter.” The Cabinet liked
the proposal but made it clear that Ottawa’s intention should be kept secret
from Quebec until after the Quebec Cabinet had met on the evening of 21
June. The Cabinet did not think that Bourassa would make a decision on
Victoria at that meeting, and it wanted to be prepared with additional incen-
tives if the Quebec Cabinet wavered on the constitutional proposal. Trudeau’s
Cabinet was clear in its objectives as the Record of Cabinet Decisions shows:
concessions on family allowance could be an important bargaining chip with
Quebec Ministers.61 A few days later, on 22 June, the federal Cabinet agreed
that “if the action was needed and had a good chance of making possible
Quebec’s acceptance of the Canadian Constitutional Charter 1971,” then the
prime minister should inform Premier Bourassa of Ottawa’s willingness to
change the Family Income Security Plan (FISP) to accord broadly with
changes proposed by Quebec and enrich the plan by the allocation of an addi-
tional $150 million. The Cabinet knew the game it was playing with social
policy and the Record of Cabinet Decisions for 22 June noted, “it would be
preferable to make no such offer unless it was essential to success on the
58 Trudeau fonds, MG 26 O7, vol. 117, Memorandum to the Prime Minister…E. Gallant, 16
February 1971.
59 DNHW, Acc. 85-86/343, box 28, file 3301-3-C8, pt. 2, Memorandum, Re: Provincial Options
to modify federal Family Income Security Plan, 20 June 1971, prepared by Bryce. Bryce noted
in his memorandum that the proposals should be put to Premier Bourassa on 23 June.
60 See Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1972), 66-8.
61 LAC, DNHW, vol. 1629, file 1, Record of Cabinet Decision, 18 June 1971.
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Constitutional issue and it was clear that it would lead to Quebec’s approval of
the Charter.”62
The next day, 23 June 1971, Bourassa formally rejected the Victoria
Charter. Ottawa had counted on Bourassa waiting until the 28 June deadline
before he rendered a final decision; his announcement caught Ottawa by sur-
prise and pre-empted Ottawa’s strategy. Trudeau’s proposed amendment to the
British North America Act, “to guarantee prior consultation of the provinces
before changing federal income security measures and to protect provincial
social allowance plans from interference by parallel federal programs,” was too
little to satisfy Quebec.63 A statement issued by Bourassa’s office gave a mea-
sure of hope to Ottawa; it was enough to ensure that family allowances would
remain at the top of the federal-provincial agenda. Bourassa insisted,
“Federalism constitutes for Quebecers the best way of attaining their economic,
social and cultural objectives” and noted the failure of the constitutional
reforms to deal adequately with social policy. “The texts dealing with income
security,” the statement noted, “leave an uncertainty that meshes badly with the
objectives inherent in any idea of constitutional revision. If this uncertainty
were eliminated, our conclusions could be different.” He and Trudeau decided
to meet in a week or so, but Bourassa had made it clear to the prime minister
that success was contingent on new powers for Quebec in the social security
field. Trudeau also told the House of Commons on 25 June that further negoti-
ations with Quebec were likely, pointing out that Bourassa had said that
“ambiguities” in language were the source of difficulty with the Victoria
Charter.64
While Bourassa may have been misleading the Liberal government in
Ottawa and English-Canadians generally with what was necessary for Quebec
to agree to constitutional reform, Ottawa believed that an agreement could be
reached with Quebec. Bourassa’s insistence on social policy reform continued
to have a major impact on policy-making in Ottawa. The Cabinet decided on 25
June to push ahead with the proposals for the Family Income Security Plan that
it had previously approved. Ottawa could not withdraw the $150 million it had
committed to lure Quebec into signing the Victoria Charter: to do so would
have caused a split in the Cabinet and, above all, shown how the Trudeau gov-
ernment had attempted to use social policy to manipulate the constitutional
agenda. However, the federal government dropped its proposal to allow
provinces to play a greater role in family allowances; it alone would determine
the structure of the benefits, perhaps in retaliation for Quebec’s rejection of the
62 Ibid., 22 June 1971.
63 Saywell and Stevens, “Parliament and Politics,” 48-9, 63. See also JeremyWebber, Reimaging
Canada: Language, Culture, Community, and the Canadian Constitution (Kingston and
Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1994), 97-9; and Haddow, Poverty in Canada, 94-6.
64 Saywell and Stevens, “Parliament and Politics,” 63-4, 68.
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Victoria Charter. The failure of the central agencies to deliver on the
Constitution allowed Health and Welfare Minister John Munro to regain a little
of his power in the Cabinet. He told the House on 29 June 1971, that he had
revised theWhite Paper to ensure that the federal plan would fit into provincial
priorities and social policies. Munro insisted that the plan embraced the anti-
poverty concept of selectivity by placing substantially large benefits in the
hands of low-income mothers, while preserving a measure of protection for
middle-income families. Moreover, an improved FISP, he said, could be dove-
tailed with the proposed Quebec social allowance plan without interfering with
its operations.65 The new scheme was to begin in May 1972. Don Jamieson, the
Newfoundland representative in the federal Cabinet, commented in his mem-
oirs, that many in Cabinet believed that “what was at first a bargaining position
involving give and take on both sides became a matter of Quebec taking while
still uncommitted to give on the constitutional issue.”66
As the federal government prepared the necessary legislation and worked
out the technical details to make payments under FISP, the issue of Quebec con-
tinued to dominate Ottawa. Munro told the Cabinet on 22 July 1971, Quebec
might attempt to frustrate Ottawa by introducing its own family allowance leg-
islation to “occupy” the income security field, leaving Ottawa to duplicate the
program with its new legislation. Even if Quebec introduced a similar program
with very low benefits, it could then claim that Ottawa was merely supple-
menting the Quebec plan with its FISP. The Cabinet wanted to prevent such
manoeuvring and initiated a publicity campaign in Quebec to explain Ottawa’s
new social policy approach directly to the people.67 The Cabinet also agreed to
proceed in early September with the legislation to replace family allowances
with the Family Income Security Plan, but it agreed that Trudeau provide
Bourassa with a draft of the legislation, inviting him to propose changes to the
federal plan; there is no evidence that the other premiers were given any such
consideration or received notification of the impending legislation.68
The strategy forced Premier Bourassa to respond. On 2 September 1971,
he wrote Trudeau that he hoped to find a way of “averting conflict” in the area
65 LAC, DNHW, vol. 1937, file R234/100, Announcement by Honourable John Munro, 29 June
1971, and House of Commons Debates, 29 June 1971.
66 Jamieson, A World Unto Itself, 187-8.
67 LAC, DNHW, vol. 1629, file 1, Memorandum to Cabinet, Three Aspects of Canada-Quebec
Relations on Income Security, prepared by Munro, 22 July 1971, and Record of Cabinet
Decision, 29 July 1971.
68 Ibid., Record of Cabinet Decision, 1 September 1971; Ibid., Record of Cabinet Decision, 29
July 1971. Interestingly, Allan J. MacEachern, the President of the Privy Council, told John
Munro on 28 July 1971, that he did not think it was possible to have the FISP legislation intro-
duced in the third session as Munro wanted. MacEachern said it might be done early in the
fourth session of the Parliament. See LAC, DNHW, vol. 2367, file 264-16-1, MacEachern to
Munro, 28 July 1971.
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of family allowances. Bourassa continued to insist that the province required
supremacy in the design of social security programs to meet its own social
policy priorities. He wanted the proposed federal legislation to reform family
allowances to conform to any existing terms, conditions, and regulations of
the family allowance legislation in Quebec. He also wanted the province to
have control over designating the recipients, the nature and the amount of the
allowances, the scale of benefits, and the total amount payable to the citizens
in that province. Trudeau was optimistic because Bourassa had intimated that
it was possible to find a legislative solution to the social policy question
rather than a constitutional one, which had derailed the Victoria Conference
earlier that summer. When Bourassa referred in his letter to family
allowances distributed by the Government of Canada, Trudeau and his offi-
cials assumed that Bourassa had come to accept a federal role in the program,
even though the nature and scope of the benefits in each province could be
determined by provincial priorities. Given that, Trudeau suggested that fed-
eral and provincial representatives meet to discuss the Quebec proposal. The
government had already decided to table the new Family Income Security
Plan in Parliament on 13 September 1971, and Trudeau told the House that a
letter from Bourassa had arrived too late for the federal government to change
the legislation it had already prepared. Amendments would be introduced in
due course.69
There was no legislative action taken on Bill C-264 after it received first
reading, as Ottawa struggled to meet Quebec’s demands. The federal govern-
ment had good reason to be patient because Bourassa had told the Le Devoir in
late September that after Quebec had found a workable solution with Ottawa on
family allowances it would begin new constitutional discussions: “Mais … je
ne veux pas m’engager, et je l’ai dit clairement au premier minister du Canada
que je ne veux du Québec qui déterminera le moment opportum de reprendre le
débat constitutional.” Quebec’s ultimate goal was to obtain sole jurisdiction
over all social policy, or legislative primacy, although it appeared at times to be
willing to contemplate something less. Quebec’s preferred approach was to
have a provincially designed basic plan for children under 18 with a supplement
for larger families included in a single plan. While it was agreeable to having
the federal government issue the cheques, it wanted the province to play an
important role in the following: having income statements verified by the
province; identifying the province on the application forms, on all literature
relating to the program and, most importantly, on the cheques issued to parents;
69 Ibid., Acc 85-86/343, box 37, file 3303-3-A16, Bourassa to Trudeau, 2 September 1971, and
Trudeau to Bourassa, 17 September 1971 (unofficial translation of both letters); and Ibid., vol.
1929, file 1, Memorandum to Cabinet 14 October 1971. Prime Minister Trudeau tabled the let-
ter from Premier Bourassa in the House of Commons on 15 September 1971.
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and having the province determine final benefit amounts using the provincial
definition of income.70
This was essentially the proposal that Bryce discussed with Cabinet earlier
in the year — as Lalonde reminded the prime minister. Various federal depart-
ments, notably Finance, Supply and Services, Health and Welfare, and the
Privy Council Office, had discussed and considered Quebec’s position through
the fall of 1971.At the same time, Lalonde was in constant communication with
Bourassa and senior officials in the Quebec government, and he suggested on a
number of occasions that the Canadian government was still interested in a con-
stitutional solution to the problems that social policy had created; but
Chouinard told him that Bourassa had no obvious enthusiasm for a particular
constitutional solution.71 By December, the departments agreed that the
Quebec plan obscured federal expenditure on the program while maximizing
provincial identification, noting that the proposal would inevitably lead to
duplication, administrative inefficiency, and public confusion.72 Even so, the
officials realized that the proposal would meet Quebec’s social policy objective
by achieving the streamlined, integrated approach that it had emphasized; any
other option would be seen in that province as further frustration of its aspira-
tions. Yet the federal authorities also wanted to ensure that it was not too easy
for provinces to redesign the FISP program. Ottawa insisted that each province
that wanted to modify the federal plan contribute at least 20 percent of federal
expenditures to the redesigned program. If the negotiations with Quebec failed,
Munro suggested that Ottawa proceed with Bill C-264 as it stood,73 but the
government allowed the legislation to lapse with the termination of the third
session of the 28th Parliament on 16 February 1972, only to announce its con-
tinued commitment to the Family Income Security Plan and its intention to
reintroduce legislation covering the Plan in the Speech from the Throne on 17
February 1972, that opened the 4th and final Session of the 28th Parliament.
Family Allowance Reforms
On 9 March 1972, in response to Quebec’s demands for a redesigned, more
flexible FISP, which would allow them to meet their own provincial social
policy objectives, Prime Minister Trudeau offered each province the right to
redesign FISP for operation within the province, subject to certain minimum
70 Trudeau fonds, MG 26 07, vol. 332, file 363.44, Lalonde to Trudeau, “Conversation télé-
phonique avec l’honorable Bourassa,” 6 décembre 1971; and LAC, DNHW, Acc 85-86/343,
box 28, file 3301-3-C1, Memorandum to Cabinet, 10 December 1971.
71 Ibid., Lalonde to Trudeau, with report on Lalonde’s conversation with Julien Chouinard, 2
décembre 1971.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., vol. 105, file 306.4, Memorandum from Lalonde to Trudeau, 3 mars 1972; and LAC,
DNHW,Acc. 85-86/343, box 28, file 3301-3-C1, Memorandum to Cabinet, 10 December 1971.
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federal standards. This had been proposed in the period leading to the Victoria
constitutional conference. In a letter to Premier Bourassa, Trudeau wrote,
“Acceptance of a plan along these lines would represent, as you will appreci-
ate, a very important change so far as the federal government is concerned.”
For the first time, a federally financed and administered program, legislated
by Parliament, would be subject to modification by the provinces even
though the amount of financial participation by the province would be small
in comparison with that of the federal government. Provinces with family
allowance programs, providing a supplement amounting to at least 15 percent
(not 20 percent as the federal inter-departmental committee had recom-
mended) of the total spent on family allowances in that province, would be
given the right to alter the monthly benefit rate, the reduction rate, and the
income threshold for FISP, provided that total federal spending on FISP did
not exceed the amount that would have been spent had this right not been
exercised. The benefits per child could not be set below 80 percent of the
national benefit rate, the threshold could not be set below the income tax
exemption level, and provincial definitions of residence could not be more
restrictive than the federal definition. Trudeau insisted that the federal defin-
ition of income would have to be used for the purpose of federal payments.
He also said that the literature describing the program would indicate clearly
that the plan in each province had been designed in accordance with provin-
cial legislation, and there would be recognition of provincial financial
participation.74
Trudeau also told Bourassa and the other premiers that the federal govern-
ment would proceed with the Family Income Support Plan legislation in the
current session, but the bill that would be presented to Parliament would not
include the provision for the kind of flexibility he now suggested. He reassured
Bourassa, however, that Ottawa would amend the bill to do so as soon as the
provinces agreed to his proposal. What must have been encouraging, particu-
larly for Bourassa, was Trudeau’s suggestion that “the principles involved [with
FISP] are clearly capable of extension to other income support programs” and
might pave the way for constitutional change in matters relating to social secu-
rity: “While the difficulties are considerable, the federal government would be
prepared to consider this kind of extension of the principles I am proposing if
a satisfactory constitutional basis can be found and if it solved the problem of
social security which remained to be cleared up to permit further progress in the
process of constitutional review.”75 Bourassa telexed the prime minister on 17
March expressing his satisfaction with the proposal and telling Trudeau, “I have
74 Ibid., MG 26 07, vol. 332, file 363.44, Lalonde to Trudeau, “Rencontre avec l’honorable
Bourassa,” 17 janvier 1972.
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a conviction that we shall soon arrive at developing a successful formula for
family allowances.”76 Constitutional reform was clearly on Trudeau’s mind. In
fact, when Trudeau met with Bourassa earlier in February, the prime minister
had insisted, “Les allocation familiales et la question constitutionnelle” be the
first item on the agenda for the meeting.77
In Trudeau’s view, he had conceded little to Quebec. The federal govern-
ment claimed that it did not recognize in the changes to FISP any provincial
supremacy in this particular social program, as it retained the undiluted right to
make direct payments to individuals anywhere in Canada. Trudeau and his
advisors had realized much earlier that there was considerable division within
the Quebec Cabinet over social security policy. Trudeau knew, however, that
Bourassa was his best chance for finding a solution within the current frame-
work of Confederation. Trudeau’s offer, in his view, had simply allowed
Bourassa to claim victory. The Premier had described it as a “great step for-
ward.” As Trudeau said in an interview with TVA television news, there were
many people in Quebec who did not want to see any agreements between the
federal and provincial governments. Trudeau realized that the agreement on
family allowances showed that Confederation continued to work, and he
expected a more cooperative attitude from Premier Bourassa in the future on
other important national issues.78
Trudeau’s letter to the other premiers outlining the proposed changes had
a different introduction than the one he sent to Bourassa. In his letter to the nine
English-speaking premiers, Trudeau briefly reviewed the course of events fol-
lowing the Victoria Constitutional Conference where Quebec had insisted on a
75 Ibid., 105, file 306.4, Trudeau to Bourassa, le 9 mars 1972; DNHW, vol. 1610, file 6, Trudeau
to Bourassa, 9 March 1972; and Department of National Health and Welfare, Acc. 85-86/343,
box 84, file 3201-3-3, pt.3, Memorandum on Policy Consideration Underlying the Design and
Development of the Family Income Security Plan, 4 January 1980. Trudeau tabled the letter in
the House a few days later. On the issue of the federal definition of income, Claude
Castonguay had stated emphatically in September 1971 that Quebec required that determina-
tion of income reside with its department of revenue. This issue was important because income
levels determined the level of allowance. See Montreal Gazette (16 March 1972).
76 Trudeau fonds, MG 26 07, vol. 105, file 306.4, Bourassa to Trudeau, le 17 mars 1072; DNHW,
Acc. 85-86/343, box 27, file 3301-3-A16, Telex to the Prime Minister from Robert Bourassa,
17 March 1972. Bourassa wrote in the telex, “I think that the proposals in your letter are in
keeping with the talks we have been having on this matter for some months and that they make
an appropriate framework within which we shall be able to draw up the specific terms and con-
ditions for an agreement at further meetings.” (translation in Trudeau fonds). See also Journal
de Montréal (14 March 1972).
77 Trudeau fonds, MG 26 07, vol. 332, file 363.44, Lalonde to Trudeau, “Rencontre avec
l’honorable Bourassa,” 17 janvier 1972.
78 See DNHW, Acc. 85-86/343, box 27, file 3301-3-P15, “Basis of Federal Approach, March
1972”; Montreal Gazette (14 March 1972); and Le Devoir (14 and 15 March 1972), for
instance.
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provision in the Constitution allowing provinces to have some measure of con-
trol over federal programs, particularly family allowances, to suit the needs of
each province. Trudeau pointed out that the Conference had tried to meet the
needs of Quebec by providing for an amendment to Section 94A of the British
North America Act, but that the Government of Quebec subsequently decided
that it could not accept the approach on income security included in the Victoria
Charter. He noted, however, that in September 1971 Premier Bourassa sug-
gested to him that an administrative arrangement through the federal and
provincial legislatures might achieve Quebec’s objectives in the area of income
support if it was proving impossible to do so constitutionally. Since that time,
Trudeau wrote, Quebec and federal officials had held discussions on the mat-
ter, but at all times Ottawa had insisted that any arrangements which might
appear feasible would have to be the subject of a discussion with all provincial
governments and would have to be equally available to all. The federal gov-
ernment was now prepared to modify the application of the federal Family
Income Security Plan, he told the premiers; and he added, “While the difficul-
ties are considerable, the federal government would be prepared to consider this
kind of extension of the principles I am proposing if a satisfactory constitu-
tional basis can be found and if it solved the problem of social security which
remained to be cleared up to permit further progress of constitutional review.”79
Many newspapers hailed these developments, which Trudeau made public
in an interview on the Reseau TVA French station on Sunday, 12 March, as a
victory for Quebec. On 13 March the Ottawa Journal claimed, “Quebec gets
control over baby bonus,” while Le Devoir saw it as “Un triple gain pour le
Québec.” This triple victory, as reported by many newspapers, was that Ottawa
agreed to most of Quebec’s proposals in the social security field; Ottawa agreed
to consider a similar approach in other sectors of social welfare jurisdiction;
and Ottawa would consider family allowances as a separate issue from the other
aspects of social welfare jurisdiction. The Toronto Globe and Mail saw
Trudeau’s jurisdictional concession as a major policy shift in federal-provincial
79 Trudeau fonds, MG26 07, vol. 105, file 306.4, Trudeau to W.A.C. Bennett, 9 March 1972. The
same letter was sent to all of the premiers with the exception of Quebec. See also DNHW, vol.
1610, file 6, Trudeau to premiers, 9 March 1972. This is not to suggest that the provinces other
than Quebec had not been involved in the discussions over FISP: they had been. Both Munro
and his officials had met with provincial ministers and their officials on numerous occasions
since the release of the White Paper. See Ibid. Acc. 85-86/343, box 27, file 3301-3-A16,
“Consultations with the Provinces,” 16 March 1972. Later, Alexander B. Campbell, Acting
Chair of the Council of Maritime Premiers, wrote Trudeau that the stipulation that the province
provide at least 15 percent of total outlays for family allowances meant that economically chal-
lenged provinces would not be able to participate in the new arrangement. “Your proposal,” he
wrote Trudeau, “would further tend to perpetuate and increase the disparity in income security
and social assistance payment levels across the country.” See Trudeau fonds, MG26 07, vol.
105, file 306.4, Campbell to Trudeau, 6 July 1972.
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affairs. The Windsor Star went so far as to suggest that the “constitutional
road [was] now open again.” La Presse, too, hinted that the Victoria talks
would soon continue, but other newspapers in Quebec expressed considerable
doubt about federal sincerity in allowing the provinces to take over family
allowances: Le Devoir wrote, “Québec scrute la teneur de la réponse
d’Ottawa.”80 Yet, as Le Droit reported, “Bourassa se dit satisfait de la
Proposition Trudeau.”
As federal and provincial officials met to plan for the arrangements nec-
essary to give effect to the federal proposals, Ottawa nearly scuppered the deal
when it announced in the federal budget on 8 May 1972, significant improve-
ments to the Old Age Security pensions and the Guaranteed Income
Supplement, as well as the special income tax exemption for the aged from
$650 to $1,000. Although there had been considerable pressure on Ottawa to
enrich support for seniors, Quebec denounced Ottawa’s unilateral action on
another income security program. The announcement threatened to undo the
deal between Quebec and Ottawa.81 Castonguay was livid and unleashed a bit-
ter attack on Ottawa, calling the proposal for the aged a “low blow” to
Quebec’s efforts to establish an integrated approach to all social benefit spend-
ing. Ottawa acted without any prior consultation with or warning to the
provinces. To Castonguay, Trudeau’s budget had demonstrated that Ottawa
could not be trusted and any hope that it had that the deal over family
allowances marked the beginning of a new era that gave the provinces a mea-
sure of control over social policy was shattered. The Toronto Star reported that
Castonguay said the administrative arrangements proposed by Trudeau and
reluctantly agreed to by Bourassa could not work. Quebec needed full juris-
diction over all aspects of social security to implement an integrated social
policy.82 Castonguay told the annual conference of Canada’s Learned
Societies in Montreal on 7 June, “It is pointless to expect sufficient consulta-
tion to ensure a unified conception of the programs concerning guaranteed
income-social aid,” adding that amiable, non-formal arrangements could not
give sufficient guarantees. He went on to say that without constitutional
change giving Quebec legislative primacy in social policy, the Canadian fed-
eration was at risk.83
Not surprisingly, federal-provincial negotiations over family allowances
80 A number of newspapers, including Ottawa Citizen, Ottawa Journal, Toronto Star, Globe and
Mail, Windsor Star, La Presse, Le Soleil, Le Devoir, and others carried major stories and edi-
torials on the development in the period from 13 March to 18 March 1972.
81 LAC, DNHW, vol. 1937, file R234/100, Osborne (Assistant Deputy Minister, Research,
Planning & Evaluation —Welfare) to Willard, 15 June 1972.
82 Montreal Gazette (13 May 1972), and Toronto Star (13 May 1972).
83 Globe and Mail (8 June 1972).
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stalled.84 On 9 June 1972, Prime Minister Trudeau reminded Bourassa that a
great deal of progress had been made by the two sides over the past few months,
and the federal government had conceded on all of Quebec’s demands. In a
veiled threat, Trudeau also reminded Bourassa of the tight time frame for the
enactment of the legislation and told him that it was necessary for Quebec to
decide quickly whether or not to proceed with the provincial option amendment
to Bill C-170. He gave Bourassa a week to make his decision.85 Bourassa had
to contend with Castonguay, who continued to argue that the only way for
Quebec to control its social policy and implement an integrated policy on
income security was through a constitutional process that addressed the divi-
sion of powers in the field of social security. The Montreal Gazette reported
that Castonguay threatened to resign after Ottawa unilaterally announced
increases to the Old Age Security pension, but reluctantly decided to stay after
Premier Bourassa assured him that Quebec would take a stronger stand with
Ottawa.86 The delay killed the legislation. Bill C-170 died on 7 July 1972, the
last day of the Session, when it failed by one vote to receive unanimous con-
sent that was necessary for Third Reading before Parliament was adjourned.
Parliament did not meet again before the federal election on 30 October 1972.
In that election Canadians sent Prime Minister Trudeau and the Liberals a
strong message that they were not impressed with their handling of affairs,
returning them to a minority government. In the unsettled period following the
election, Trudeau re-organized his priorities to win support from the New
Democratic Party (NDP) by promising action on social policy and a program to
increase the presence of the state in the national economy. These changes kept
the Liberal government in office until 8 May 1974, but the compromise with
the NDP effectively stymied any fundamental change to the family allowances
program that targeted low-income families through selective measures con-
tained in the FISP. Trudeau must have been appalled that his important
constitutional plans had foundered on something as unimportant (to him) as
social policy, and he handed the National Health and Welfare portfolio to Marc
Lalonde, his former private secretary and constitutional advisor, to fix the
social policy problem with Quebec. Trudeau had made it clear to Lalonde that
he wanted a major review of Canada’s social security system to integrate fed-
eral and provincial social security policies, and reform the various programs
based on a number of specific principles around which a national consensus of
opinion might be formulated. This approach was designed to avoid the consti-
tutional impasse that had derailed the earlier constitutional agreement in
84 LAC, DNHW, Acc. 85-86/343, box 28, file 3301-3-C12, Draft Statement by the Honourable
John Munro, 28 July 1972.
85 Trudeau fonds, MG 26 07, vol. 105, file 306.4, Trudeau to Bourassa, le 9 juin 1972; and
DNHW, vol. 1610, file 4, Trudeau to Bourassa, 9 June 1972.
86 Montreal Gazette (17 May 1972), and La Presse (18 and 22 July 1972).
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1971.87 In the January 1973 throne speech, the federal government promised
“that Canada’s total social security system — including both federal and
provincial elements — must be reconsidered and reorganized, and made more
sensitive to the needs of people in different parts of the country.”88 Castonguay
could have written the words himself, and it showed that Canada had entered a
new period of harmonic federalism on social policy, at least.
The review of Canada’s social security system began when Lalonde tabled
the Working Paper on Social Security (the Orange Paper) in the House of
Commons on 18 April 1973. The Working Paper was the federal government’s
contribution towards a joint federal-provincial review of Canada’s social security
system, and the provinces all agreed to participate in the exercise.89 The Cabinet
wanted to avoid putting a series of proposals on the table that would clash with
the objectives of the provincial governments, particularly those of Quebec; but
the Cabinet wanted a concrete family allowance proposal put before the
provinces at the April meeting of welfare ministers.90 This effort would reassure
Canadians that the Liberal government was committed to substantial and imme-
diate benefits through universal family allowances, as well as provide tangible
evidence that the government was serious about meaningful social reform. It was
also clear that the principle of universality in social programs would not be threat-
ened as long as the Liberals remained in a minority position in Parliament.91
The Working Paper proposed that family allowances be increased from an
average of $7.21 per child per month to an average of $20 per child, and be made
taxable. The 1970 White Paper recommendation to eliminate the universality of
family allowances had fallen victim to the political pressures of keeping the
minority government in office and the need for provincial approval. Further evi-
dence of the political practicalities was Lalonde’s proposal that the level of
benefit be reviewed periodically in relation to changes in the Consumer Price
Index (as Old Age Security had been several months earlier). Lalonde suggested,
subject to a national minimum and assuming the development of a consensus
regarding provincial flexibility and national norms, the precise amount paid for
87 On the point, see Splane, “Social Policy-Making in the Government of Canada,” 237.
88 Stevens and Saywell, “Parliament and Politics,” 105.
89 The Joint Review of Canada’s Social Security System turned out to be a long and complicated
process and its final outcome is beyond the scope of this paper. The reform of Family andYouth
Allowances and the decision to integrate the federal Family Allowance Program with the
provincial schemes were a part of the review, but family allowance reforms were completed by
the end of 1973. Family allowances did not figure prominently in the review after that date.
90 LAC, DNHW, Acc. 85-86/343, box 26, file 3301-3-A3, pt. 2, A.W. Johnson to Lalonde, 26
March 1973. John Turner wrote to Marc Lalonde on 23 March 1973, suggesting that a family
allowance proposal be put to the provinces in April.
91 MacInnis Papers, vol. 15, file Social Security, 1966–1974, “Speech Delivered by the
Honourable Marc Lalonde to the Montreal Chamber of Commerce on Canada’s Social
Security Policy,” 5 February 1973.
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each child would be left to the provinces, as with the proposed FISP. Provinces
could choose to vary the amount paid either by the age of the child or the size of
the family. With an obvious reference to Quebec, Lalonde noted that it was a
major constitutional innovation to permit the provinces to determine the benefits
paid to individual Canadians by the Government of Canada, within the limits set
by Parliament.92 This flexibility allowed provinces to design their own income
support and supplementation programs for families and would mark the intro-
duction of a new — yet much discussed and anticipated — approach to
federal-provincial relations in the social security field.93 When Ottawa accepted
a provincial role in a national program such as family allowances after spending
more than a generation defending its sole prerogative to legislate in the field, it
ensured itself a role in this area for some years to come. Quebec newspapers saw
the change as a decisive step and a major breakthrough for Quebec. La Presse
wrote, “Fasse le ciel que l’esprit de conciliation dont fait prévue M. Lalonde con-
tribute à metre un terme aux différents constitutionnels qui ont trop longtemps
paralysé l’évolution constitutionnelle du Canada.”94 The English Canadian media
saw the legislation simply as an increase in family allowances benefits.
On 16 July 1973, Marc Lalonde introduced in Parliament the new reforms
to the family allowances program, claiming it represented a new formula for
federal-provincial cooperation in the area of social security.95 Only three
provinces took advantage of the federal offer that provinces be allowed to
determine benefits. Not surprisingly, Quebec was one; Alberta and Prince
Edward Island were the others. The increase now gave Quebec control of $8
of federal payment when it had only asked for control of $7.21 — the average
monthly federal expenditure per child on family allowance when Quebec
asked Ottawa to transfer control of the program to Quebec City. Even though
Ottawa had insisted there was no additional money, with the reforms the fam-
92 DNHW,Acc. 85-86/343, vol. 31, file 3301-3-C47, News Release, Health and Welfare Canada,
18 April 1973.
93 As P.E. Bryden has argued for the Quebec and Canada Pension Plans, this shared approach to
the administration of family allowances also represented a new method of negotiating with the
provinces that served to enhance the role of the federal government while, at the same time,
strengthening national unity. See P.E. Bryden, Planners and Politicians: Liberal Politics and
Social Policy (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997).
94 La Presse (20 April 1973).
95 Ottawa had also bowed to the pressure to maintain the universality feature of family
allowances and permitted every Canadian family the privilege of receiving a monthly cheque,
although introducing a measure of income redistribution through the tax system. In a period of
rising living costs, the Liberal government could boast that with its new social security legis-
lation, it added $840 million to the incomes of mainly low and middle-income families. The
total cost for family allowances was then $1.83 billion annually. See DNHW, vol. 2081, file
20-2-2, pt. 3, News Release, Minister Introduces New Family Allowance Legislation, July
1973. It was estimated that the tax recovery for the Federal Treasury would be $350 million
and a further $115 million for the Provincial treasuries.
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ily allowance program cost nearly $1 billion dollars.96 When Premier
Bourassa announced Quebec’s plan on 19 September 1973 — just days before
the provincial election — he said that it “constituted an admirable example of
a type of federalism which is both flexible and beneficial for Quebec.” It was
Social Welfare Minister Claude Castonguay who championed the new Quebec
Family Allowances Program that would cover all children up to the age of 17,
thus eliminating Quebec’s Schooling Allowances that had been created when
the province opted out of the federal Youth Allowance program. The Province
set the benefits according to the number and age of the children, as provided
under the provisions of the Bill before Parliament. Federal monthly
allowances were pegged at $12 for the first child, $18 for the second, $28 for
the third, and $31 for the fourth and each additional child in the family.
Additionally, the basic allowance was supplemented by an age premium of $5,
paid for children between the age of 12 and 17 years. The Quebec government
administered and financed a separate Quebec scheme which provided addi-
tional monthly allowances of $3 for the first child, $4 for the second, $5 for
the third, and $6 for each additional child. The Quebec benefits were adminis-
tered through the Quebec Pension Board that was already in charge of family
and school allowances. Further, the Quebec Government decided to make its
family allowances tax-free because it felt middle-income families would carry
too great a burden if family allowances were taxed, though the federal portion
would be subject to federal income tax. Castonguay noted that Quebec had
sufficient freedom of action to establish a structure of its own under the pro-
posed federal legislation, and he claimed that the new Family Allowances
Program took into consideration the special needs and circumstances of
Quebec families — particularly those of large families in the middle and low
income bracket — whose interest had not been sufficiently considered under
the earlier federal schemes.97 A short time later, Castonguay resigned from the
Quebec legislature and became a consultant to Mr. Lalonde. His mission was
accomplished.
The legislation passed third reading in November 1973, and parents saw
the increases in cheques that arrived in January 1974. Lalonde inserted a mes-
sage in the cheques going to Quebec, explaining the main features of the new
program. He wanted to make clear that, while the provincial government asked
96 Leonard Shifrin, “Income Security: The Rise and Fall of the Federal Role,” in Canadian Social
Welfare Policy: Federal and Provincial Dimensions, ed. Jacqueline Ismael, 24-5.
97 LAC, DNHW, Acc. 84-85/085, box 2m file 2106-71-6, pt. 1, Press Release, Government of
Quebec, Executive Branch, 19 September 1973. Bourassa also said the there would be reform
in the province’s welfare program in light of the changes in the family allowance program so
that family allowances and welfare benefits were never greater than the income from employ-
ment calculated on the basis of the minimum wages so that individuals will be encouraged to
work.
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Ottawa to vary federal payments based on the age and number of children in a
family, the Canadian Government paid an average of $20 to each child in
Quebec. Lalonde wanted to show that the federal government was still largely
responsible for the payment of family allowances in the province. It was a
month later before parents in the other provinces received a similar note from
the minister.98
Conclusion
The example of the family allowances program suggests that Canada’s federal
system had an important impact on the development of family allowances espe-
cially as the two levels of government attempted to resolve outstanding
constitutional issues. When a nationalist Quebec government demanded that
Ottawa withdraw from the social policy field and transfer monies expended on
such programs to the provinces, family allowances became intricately involved
in the minefield of Canadian inter-governmental relations. Because family
allowances were one of the few programs shared by all Canadian families and
one of the means of building social cohesion across the country, the federal
government initially refused to allow any provincial involvement in the pro-
gram. By the early 1970s, however, family allowances was elevated from
sectoral or “low politics” to the realm of “high politics.”
Family allowance had rarely been the concern of the prime minister except
when the program was introduced in 1945, but during the constitutional nego-
tiations during in 1970 and 1971 this issue moved to the centre of Canadian
politics. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau proved willing to make changes to the
family allowance program as a means of enticing Quebec Premier Robert
Bourassa to amend the British North America Act. In those inter-governmental
negotiations to patriate the Constitution, family allowances played an instru-
mental role. Ottawa promised certain reforms to the program to satisfy some of
Quebec’s social and constitutional objectives and its demands for greater auton-
omy within the Canadian federation as a way to move the constitutional file to
a conclusion. The changes made to family allowances, to allow the provinces
to determine how the benefits were allocated to parents, came as a result of the
political manoeuvring with Quebec. Even so, Trudeau realized — as
Mackenzie King had much earlier — that family allowance served as a link
between the federal government and individual Canadian citizens in various
regions and especially in Quebec. Even as the program was being reformed, the
federal government made certain that family allowances remained a nation-
building tool to help foster a pan-Canadian citizenship and attachment to the
Government of Canada. The federal government, it might be concluded,
98 Ibid., vol. 1609, file 6, “January Family Allowances Insert for Quebec,” and “An Important
Message for Fathers and Mothers.”
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designed some of its family allowance reforms to counter the province-build-
ing project in which the Quebec provincial government was so heavily
involved.
What is equally clear is that the Department of National Health and
Welfare, which had pushed for selectivity over universality in family
allowances to get additional funds into the hands of parents in greatest need,
failed in some of its aims in the 1970s, even though the Liberal government had
initially agreed with that approach. However, when constitutional reform and
inter-governmental conflict moved to centre stage in the early 1970s, family
allowance reform became a surrogate for the broader political issues of the day.
When that happened, family allowance reform became for Ottawa a bargaining
chip to be used with Quebec. Ottawa hoped that by accommodating Quebec on
social policy it might clear the way for Trudeau’s constitutional renewal and
reform. Subsequently, Ottawa permitted the provinces greater control over the
federal family allowance program and in the process lost sight of its original
objectives in its initial family allowance reform package. Still, Ottawa managed
to reinforce the nation-building intent of the program even as it made conces-
sions to the Quebec. However, targeted social spending, which had initially
been the primary goal of family allowances reform, would have to wait.
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